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This paper examines the problem of evil in nature, that is, the issue of the disvalue present in 
nature, and the question of whether or not it prevails over happiness. The paper claims that 
disvalue actually outweighs happiness in nature. This is an unavoidable consequence of the 
existence of an evolutionary process in a context where resources are scarce. Because of this, 
suffering and early death are the norm in nature. The number of individuals who come into 
existence just to die in pain shortly after, vastly outweighs the number of those who survive. 
The paper also claims that the idea that the interests of nonhuman animals need not be con-
sidered in the same way as those of humans is speciesist and unacceptable, and that animals 
not only have an interest in not suffering, but also in not dying. In light of this, the paper 
concludes that the good things present in nature are vastly outweighed by the huge amount 
of disvalue that exists there, and that we should try to reduce such disvalue. 
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What a book a devil’s chaplain might write on the clumsy, 
wasteful, blundering, low, and horribly cruel works of nature!  2
 1 This work was done with the support of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Inno-
vation (research project FFI2008-06414-C03-01/FISO). A previous version of this paper 
appeared in Spanish in 2011 in a special issue on the problem of evil in nature in the 
journal Ágora. Papeles de filosofía 30 (2): 57-75. The current version includes a number of 
modifications to the initial paper. 
 2 Thus starts a letter by Charles Darwin to Joseph D. Hooker, dated on July 13, 
1856, reflecting how Darwin was appalled at the disvalue caused by natural processes 
(Darwin [1908] 2005, 94).
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1. what doES thE problEm of diSvaluE in naturE
 conSiSt of?
The problem of the disvalue present in nature, and of its prevalence over 
the value in nature, is one of the most significant aspects of the classic 
problem of evil. Despite this, the importance of this question remains for 
the most part unrecognized in the literature. This is because life in natural 
environments is commonly seen as good for animals. Of course, most of us 
are aware that nonhuman animals suffer different kinds of harms in nature, 
which cause them to suffer, undergo deprivations and mutilations, and die 
prematurely. Still, even though we know this occurs, we usually do not give 
much importance to it. 
We tend to think that these are just a few occasional episodes that can 
occur in the lives of some animals, within a general framework in which 
pleasant life is the norm. We believe this is a perfectly acceptable cost in 
comparison to the good which a life in natural habitats provides animals. 
In addition, it is believed by many that these harms are trivial even 
though they would be really tragic if human beings suffered them, because 
it is assumed that nonhuman animals are not morally considerable, or at 
least not in the way humans are. Furthermore, it is often considered that the 
suffering of animals in nature is just something that should occur because 
it is part of the processes that occur in nature, and the contemplation of 
nature is something valuable for human beings. Finally, it is sometimes 
argued that nature embodies some values that outweigh the disvalue that 
animals may suffer in it. 
This paper will claim that these ideas about the value and disvalue 
present in nature do not correspond with what happens in reality, and that 
the moral arguments to dismiss this as unimportant fail. This is a very seri-
ous ethical issue which should receive careful attention. In support of this, 
sections 2, 3 and 4 will present the reasons why, contrary to what is often 
believed, suffering (and premature death) in nature vastly outweighs well-
being. Sections 5 and 6 will argue that we should reject the views which 
claim that animal suffering is not something worthy of moral attention. 
These arguments also imply not just that our pleasure in the contempla-
tion of nature is not a sound reason to deny the disvalue present in it, 
but also that the disvalue is more relevant than such pleasure. Section 7 
will maintain that we must reject the idea that natural processes embody 
certain values so significant that they make the disvalue suffered by non-
human animals trivial by comparison. Finally, section 8 will examine the 
conclusions that can be inferred from all this concerning our reasons for 
action. 
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2. thE diSvaluE SuffErEd by animalS in naturE
Although many see nature as a paradisiacal place, an immense amount of 
disvalue takes place in it. There is one way this occurs that is especially 
visible, which traditionally has raised the most doubts and concerns about 
this issue: the way animals attack each other. This consists basically in 
predation and parasitism. It is known how this affected one of the first 
theorists who started to reflect about the question of the disvalue in nature, 
Charles Darwin. He thought the idea that we live in a good world is hardly 
compatible with the fact that in nature there are nonhuman animals who 
suffer enormously and die due to attacks by other animals that occur not 
occasionally but continually. He therefore confessed in 1860 (in a letter to 
Asa Gray): “I cannot persuade myself that a beneficent and omnipotent 
God would have designedly created the Ichneumonidae with the express 
intention of their feeding within the living bodies of Caterpillars” (Darwin 
[1901] 2004, 105)  3.
It would be misguided, however, to think that predation and parasit-
ism are the only ways animals are harmed in nature. There are many other 
ways. Animals suffer from malnutrition and starve to death, endure terrible 
diseases, suffer from cold, heat and other weather conditions, and are hurt 
in accidents, among other harms.
As I have pointed out above, many could think that all these circum-
stances would be exceptions throughout the more or less happy lives ani-
mals lead. This idea, however, is contradicted by the fact that there are 
animals who die young as a result of them. Moreover, there are animals 
who die after living lives in which they cannot experience virtually any 
wellbeing, though they do experience a great deal of suffering. In these 
cases it cannot be claimed that the harms undergone by the animals are 
just anomalous episodes. Nevertheless, it could still be argued that those 
harms would be sporadic and secondary within a general scheme in which 
wellbeing prevails in nature.
As we will see later, we have reasons to doubt these are infrequent 
cases. At any rate, even if these cases were anomalous, the evaluation we 
would make of this problem would not necessarily be positive. On the con-
trary, that would depend on the kind of position we assume in value theory 
and ethics. We will see now why this is so. 
 3 On this see also Mill (1874) 1969 and Gould 1994.
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3. diffErEnt thEoriES about aggrEgatE valuE
 and diSvaluE
There are certain conceptions of value which entail that how good or bad 
an outcome is is determined by the total sum of wellbeing and suffering 
of the individuals that are present in it, regardless of how that wellbeing 
is distributed. This is what utilitarianism claims. According to this view, 
if the total amount of animal suffering existing in nature were less than 
the total amount of positive wellbeing present in it, the balance would be 
positive overall. Other theories reject this. There are two types of theories 
that could find such an outcome negative. 
First, there are theories for which the way value and disvalue is distrib-
uted also matters. If some individuals live good lives, while others live lives 
that contain more suffering than wellbeing, that would not be good accord-
ing to these theories. This would be the case even if the total amount of 
positive value were higher than the total disvalue present in that situation. 
And this is actually the way things are in nature. Many of the animals who 
come into existence have lives that contain little more than suffering. Due 
to this, according to these views, the enormous amount of suffering present 
in nature cannot be compensated by the fact that others are enjoying well-
being. These are all the views according to which the unequal distribution 
of wellbeing and suffering is something negative, such as egalitarianism and 
prioritarianism (Temkin 1993; Holtug 2007; Faria 2014). And all those that 
consider that an outcome cannot be good if there are individuals whose 
lives do not reach a minimum level of wellbeing for their lives to be worth 
living, such as sufficientarianism (Crisp 2003).
There are others theories according to which positive value, if it exists, 
can never compensate for the existence of disvalue. This is the case with 
negative consequentialist theories. Other non-consequentialist theories, 
such as deontological ones, can also assume this value theory (Mayerfeld 
1999). According to these views, the disvalue present in nature cannot be 
countervailed in any way. 
This means that even if cases in which wild animals have to endure ter-
rible lives were scarce, that would still be a very negative situation accord-
ing to a number of views. 
All this, however, does not mean that those accepting an aggregative 
viewpoint such as the one assumed by utilitarianism would reject interven-
ing in nature to help animals as those defending the theories we have just 
seen would promote. Those accepting an aggregate viewpoint such as the 
one assumed by utilitarianism would also have reasons to support doing so. 
Even if value in nature exceeded disvalue, they would still have to conclude 
The Problem of Evil in Nature
21
Relations – 3.1 - June 2015
http://www.ledonline.it/Relations/
that it is a bad thing that such disvalue occurs. They would thus be in favor 
of reducing that disvalue as much as possible as long as the total amount of 
value were not reduced. 
Most importantly, there are reasons to think that in fact it is not the 
case that the value present in nature outweighs the disvalue found in it. 
This means that those who accept an aggregative viewpoint such as a 
utilitarian one will reach a similar conclusion to those who do not accept an 
aggregate viewpoint.
4. thE rEaSon why diSvaluE vaStly outwEighS valuE
 in naturE
The question we need to address here is whether suffering prevails over 
positive wellbeing, or it is the other way around. How can that question 
be assessed? In Parerga and Paralipomena Schopenhauer gave an answer 
which is simple but on the right track, when he wrote:
Whoever wants summarily to test the assertion that the pleasure in the world 
outweighs the pain, or at any rate that the two balance each other, should 
compare the feelings of an animal that is devouring another with those of 
that other. ([1851] 2000, II, § 149)
To be sure, Schopenhauer’s criterion is not a very rigorous one, since in 
nature there are other sources of suffering and pleasure apart from eating 
and being eaten. Nonetheless, there is some truth in it. Wellbeing and 
suffering are tools for the self-regulation of the homeostasis of organisms 
and for other aims that maximize the transmission of their genetic infor-
mation. They work by motivating them positively or negatively depending 
on whether or not they get what they need for that matter. Animals suffer 
when they lack the resources they need (for instance, when they cannot 
eat). They also suffer when they are hurt, as it happens when other animals 
use them as resources in harmful ways (being eaten by another animals is a 
clear instance of this). This means that the availability of resources and the 
way they are distributed determines the balance between the value and the 
disvalue in nature. 
Unfortunately, as Schopenhauer appears to think, this balance ends up 
being negative. This is due to two circumstances. The first is the fact that 
those resources are indeed limited. The second is the existence of an evolu-
tionary process that favors the maximization of the transmission of genetic 
information. These two circumstances together cause many beings to come 
into existence, for whom there will not be enough resources. Moreover, 
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in many cases the beings who survive use other animals as resources for 
themselves. 
There are animals who starve to death or are eaten by others. Because 
of the two conditions presented above, this is commonly the case. The 
maximization of the transmission of genetic material implies, in most cases, 
a process that also maximizes disvalue. This occurs because the reproduc-
tive strategy prevailing in nature tends to maximize the number of sentient 
beings who starve or are eaten  4. This process can be explained in popula-
tion dynamics as follows.
For a population to continue existing through time it is necessary that 
a sufficient number of animals of the next generation survives. For their 
numbers to remain stable it is necessary that on average, a number of indi-
viduals approximately equal to that of the previous generation survives. 
The different reproductive strategies achieve this (of course, these strate-
gies are not chosen as such by the animals themselves, but are the result of 
the two factors pointed out above). There are two main strategies.
 (i) The first consists in maximizing the survival chances of the animals who 
come into existence. This implies that parents provide their progeny 
with the care necessary for them not to die prematurely. This is possible 
only when that care is focused on just one offspring, or on a very small 
number of them. This strategy is commonly known in population biology 
as K-selection. K-selected animals are also known as K-strategists.
 (ii) The second consists in maximizing the number of animals who come 
into existence. This means that every time an animal reproduces she 
has an enormous number of offspring. This makes it very hard, if not 
impossible, for parents to give their offspring the care they could have 
provided if they had had just one or a few offspring. Animals who follow 
this strategy thus have a very low survival rate. As so few individuals are 
born, the available resources needed for them to survive are reduced. 
This reproductive strategy is commonly called r-selection, and the ani-
mals following it r-strategists.  5
 4 Even if the available resources in nature were scarce it would be possible for suf-
fering and premature death to be at relatively low levels if sentient beings did not acted in 
ways that maximize the transmission of their genetic material. However, this could not be, 
since those beings would not persist through natural history. 
 5 The names of these two reproductive strategies are due to an important equation 
used in population dynamics to account for the variations in population numbers: dN/dt = 
rN(1-N/K). In this equation, given a population whose initial number of individuals is N, 
its variation during time t depends on two variables: r, which represents the reproductive 
rate of the population (the number of individuals that come into existence) and K, which 
represents the carrying capacity of the ecosystem in which this population is (ultimately, 
the odds each new individual survives). r-strategists maximize r, while K-strategists maxi-
mize K (MacArthur and Wilson 1967; Pianka 1970). Contemporary life history theorists 
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If all animals, or at least most of them, were K-strategists, the amount of 
disvalue that exists in nature would be relatively small. However, this is 
not what happens. The animals who follow this reproductive strategy must 
have very complex behavior, which is the result of a long and complicated 
evolutionary process. They are usually specialist animals who thrive in very 
particular environmental conditions. Due to this, they are very sensitive to 
important changes in their habitats.
These are very restrictive requirements, which favors the predomi-
nance of r-selection in nature. Therefore, the vast majority, in fact almost 
all the animals that exist in nature, are r-strategists. Only some vertebrates, 
such as certain mammals and birds, have just one offspring each time they 
reproduce. Others have reproductive strategies that combine both options, 
so they have several offspring who receive some parental care, though less 
than the care K-strategists usually give to their progeny. Still, the great 
majority of the animals existing in nature are much more characteristically 
r-strategists, and reproduce by laying enormous amounts of eggs (often 
thousands or tens of thousands, and in some cases millions of them)  6.
This means that the number of animals that come into existence only 
to die shortly after is extremely high. On average, if we consider a context 
in which populations remain stable at least in the mid term, for each animal 
that reproduces, only one of her or his offspring survives (otherwise animal 
populations would grow exponentially very fast, and would become mas-
sive with just one generation). This means that all the rest of the animals 
die. Many of them die shortly after coming into existence. 
These animals starve to death, are eaten by other animals, or die for 
other reasons that usually entail a great deal of suffering. This means that 
an enormous number of animals come into existence only to suffer. Their 
lives contain virtually no enjoyment, since they die shortly after they start 
to exist. However, their lives do contain significant suffering, because of 
the painful ways in which they die. They thus live lives in which disvalue 
outweighs value. Living their lives causes them more harm than good. In 
fact, in many cases it causes them great harm and no good at all. 
All this determines the balance between value and disvalue in nature. 
What we have just seen entails that the animals whose lives contain pre-
dominantly suffering are an overwhelming majority. In fact, they account 
have criticized r/K selection theory for several reasons different from the simple claim 
that some animals reproduce by maximizing their offspring and others by maximizing 
their offspring’s survival (Stearns 1992). This paper just assumes this basic claim without 
endorsing the whole r/K selection theory.
 6 The vertebrate that lays more eggs, the sunfish, may deposit up to 300 million eggs 
each time (Froese and Luna 2004).
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for almost all the animals that come into existence. This is because (i) virtu-
ally all the sentient r-strategists suffer this fate (all except around one per 
parent); and (ii) because the overwhelming majority of the animals exist-
ing on this planet are r-strategists. The wellbeing that thus exists in nature 
pales in comparison to the astronomical amount of disvalue, because of the 
suffering and premature death that it also contains (Sagoff 1993; Ng 1995; 
Tomasik 2015).
We might point out that such disvalue is not so significant by noting 
that not all the animals that come into existence and die without becoming 
adults suffer so terribly. This is because many of these animals are not sen-
tient when they die, so they do not experience any suffering (or, it could be 
pointed out, any loss when they die). Many others, while sentient, may not 
have very vivid experiences. It seems very plausible that sentience develops 
gradually. Accordingly, maybe the suffering they endure is reduced (at least 
in comparison with the suffering other animals may feel). In addition, there 
are animals who have very quick deaths. Finally, there are many animals 
who may die before adulthood yet live long enough to enjoy some positive 
experiences. All this means that not all the animals that come into existence 
and do not make it through adulthood have lives that contain more suffer-
ing than positive wellbeing. 
This limits significantly the negative effects which otherwise may occur 
as a consequence of r-selection. However, it does not eliminate them totally, 
but only to some extent. Even if some animals die without being sentient, 
or without suffering a great deal, many others have more developed nerv-
ous systems when they die, and die in ways that cause them great suffering. 
Moreover: even if there are beings with a very low level of consciousness 
who almost do not feel their experiences, their experiences still count for 
something. All suffering counts, including mild suffering. This means that 
if mild suffering is undergone by a huge number of individuals, as occurs in 
nature, its total sum gets enormously high. All this apart from the fact that, 
as we have seen, from those viewpoints for which distribution is relevant, 
and those for which disvalue is not compensated by value, the existence 
of individuals whose lives contain little more than suffering is enormously 
negative, even if that suffering is not as bad as the suffering that other indi-
viduals are capable of undergoing. Finally, even though many animals may 
have some enjoyments before they die, there are others who do not. And 
there are many who may have some enjoyments but not enough to compen-
sate for the disvalue of their suffering and early death.
Due to all this r-selection can be said to be the main cause of suffering 
in the wild. This does not mean that there is no positive wellbeing at all in 
nature. Nor does it mean that K-selected animals do not suffer significantly 
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as well. It is, though, the factor that makes suffering outweigh positive well-
being. In fact, this is something that could hardly have been different. As 
we have seen, r-selection is just the result we should expect of processes 
which tend to maximize the transmission of genetic material to new genera-
tions in combination with the fact that resources are limited. 
This is something most of us do not think about. One important reason 
for this is that when we think of animals living in nature we tend to think of 
adult animals. Moreover, we also tend to think of vertebrates, especially, in 
most cases, mammals or bids, and often large animals. That is, we tend to 
think of those among which K-selection is more common. This drives away 
from our minds r-strategists, and with them the disvalue that is present in 
ecosystems. But this happens only because the animals we tend to think of 
are not representative of those who really exist in nature. As we have seen, 
most of the animals who come into existence are very young animals who 
will die very soon.
5. thE diSrEgard for nonhuman animalS
There are people who think all this is irrelevant, because they believe that 
animal suffering and death is not really a disvalue, or because they think 
we should only care for the harms that human beings suffer. There is a 
widespread view according to which nonhuman animals are not worthy of 
full moral consideration, that only humans deserve. 
This viewpoint is defended commonly  7 by indicating that only humans 
possess certain complex cognitive capacities, or other related capacities 
(Paton 1984; Ferry 1992; Scruton 1996), that only they have certain special 
relations of solidarity between them (Whewell 1852, 223; Becker 1983), 
that they are more powerful than others, etc. (Narveson 1987; Goldman 
2001). But for those arguments to succeed they must fulfill a necessary 
requirement. They must appeal to a criterion that is satisfied by all human 
beings and only by them. However, the aforementioned criteria (the pos-
session of certain capacities or relations) do not satisfy that condition. Some 
human beings with intellectual functional diversity, as well as babies, have 
intellectual capacities that are less developed than those that a number of 
nonhuman animals possess. There are also many human beings with whom 
 7 In other cases this view is defended by appealing to the mere fact that humans are 
members of our own species or by appealing to criteria which cannot be verified, such 
as religious reasons (Diamond 1995; Reichmann 2000; Gaita 2003; Posner 2004). These 
claims fail to provide any sound reason to support disregard for nonhuman animals.
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no one has any relation of solidarity or who are helpless among others who 
are more powerful than them. If we assume the moral relevance of these 
criteria we will accept that none of these humans be granted full moral 
consideration, and so may be considered disadvantageously or not taken 
into account at all.
If we think that, despite this, these human beings should be respected, 
and their interests should be fully taken into account, we cannot accept 
that in order to be morally considerable we need to have special relations 
of solidarity, sympathy, power, or other similar relations. This shows that 
these criteria fail to draw a difference between human beings and other 
animals. 
In addition, we would also reject these criteria if we understand that 
when it comes to taking an entity into account in our moral decisions, 
what is relevant is that entity’s capacity to be affected by those decisions. 
If we make our decisions based on relevant factors, all beings who can be 
benefited or harmed by our actions must be considered. This includes non-
human animals, given that they can feel suffering and wellbeing. Accept-
ing criteria that are based only on relevant factors implies that we cannot 
justify the view that considers the interests of nonhuman animals disadvan-
tageously in comparison to those of humans (Pluhar 1995; Dombrowski 
1997; Horta 2014). That view is a form of discrimination, which is called 
speciesism. To hold the view that the harms suffered by nonhuman animals 
in nature should not be of moral concern but accept that those same harms 
would be of moral concern if they were suffered by human beings is to 
assume a speciesist position.
In light of this, consider the idea that the emotional satisfaction or the 
pleasure we may obtain from contemplating nature outweighs the disvalue 
that nonhuman animals can suffer in it. That idea assumes that our interest 
in that kind of benefit would be more significant than the interests animals 
have in not being victims of the harms they suffer in nature. This, however, 
appears to be totally implausible, given how significant those harms are. 
In fact, if we had to undergo the harm animals suffer in nature to be able 
to enjoy its contemplation it is clear that we would conclude it would not 
be worth it. Even if we were not the ones suffering and the total benefit 
derived by those contemplating nature were greater than the total harm of 
those who suffered for it, to many this would still be unfair, since it would 
mean benefiting some by harming others. This shows that the disvalue suf-
fered by animals in nature is not worth the benefits we enjoy out of its 
contemplation.
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6. thE harm of dEath
It might be thought that the fact that animals agonize in nature only harms 
them to the extent that it makes them suffer, but not because it causes them to 
die. It is sometimes argued that in order for death to be a harm to a being, that 
being must be conscious of being a separate entity that exists through time 
(Cigman 1981). There are, however, strong reasons to challenge this view. 
According to an argument that dates back at least to Epicurus 
([ca.  300  BC] 1964), death cannot harm us, because it cannot affect us 
before we die and, not being something one can experience, it does not 
affect us after we die either. The standard reply to this argument claims 
that death is not an intrinsic harm, but an extrinsic one: a harm by depriva-
tion. Dying at a certain time t would harm us because it would deprive us 
of the positive things we would have had after that time t had not we died 
at t (Nagel 1970; McMahan 2002; Broome 2004; Bradley 2009).
If a being has the capacity to have positive experiences it would be pos-
sible for that being to have them in the future. This means that any being 
with this capacity can be deprived of positive experiences. Therefore, sen-
tient animals are harmed by death. If this is right, we must conclude that ani-
mals are not harmed only when they suffer in nature: the fact that they die 
prematurely is a disvalue as well. This entails that the total negative balance 
in nature caused by the vast prevalence of suffering over wellbeing is also 
increased by the enormous number of premature deaths taking place in it.
7. iS thErE a valuE in natural procESSES
 that ovErShadowS natural diSvaluE?
We have seen in the previous sections that any view which values the 
wellbeing of sentient beings will have to conclude that in nature disvalue 
is the norm for them. However, there are theories of value according to 
which it is not individuals, but other kinds of entities that are the real loca-
tions of value. According to these theories, it is entities such as the sum 
of all living beings (that is, biocenoses), or the systems resulting from the 
interactions between these entities and between them and their physical 
environments (ecosystems) that are valuable. For these holistic positions 
individuals count only instrumentally as long as they further other aims. 
Accordingly, sacrificing their interests will be something positive if it grants 
the conservation of natural entities such as ecosystems. This means that the 
suffering and death of animals in nature will be of little or no concern to 
anyone holding such views. 
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Moreover, we must bear in mind that the suffering and death we find 
in nature is something intrinsic to how ecosystems work. It is not that in 
the natural world several things occur in a disconnected way so we have 
on the one hand the processes of which ecosystems consist (or which give 
rise to them) and on the other hand the circumstances that make it the 
case that the suffering and death of animals takes place massively. Rather, 
these are all the same: the very interactions that shape ecosystems in their 
present form are what cause, directly or indirectly, the suffering and death 
of animals. This is why different environmentalist theorists (Callicott 1989; 
Rolston 1992 and 1999; Sagoff 1993; Hettinger 1994) have argued against 
the viewpoints that defend the moral consideration of all animals, or at 
least against the moral consideration of nonhuman animals in the wild as 
individuals. They have done so because they are aware that there is a con-
flict between granting consideration to wholes and granting it to individual 
animals, and they choose the former instead of the latter. 
It is important to note that these theorists do not maintain the same 
view in the case of human beings, even though today most people (includ-
ing these theorists themselves) believe that human beings alter ecosystems 
very significantly, and much more than other animals do. Holding a truly 
holistic view would entail having to promote radical restrictions to human 
activity, and more than that, it would also entail the massive killing of 
humans to reduce their impact on natural systems. This can help us to see 
why views that value wholes more than individuals are very questionable, 
and also why those theorists who claim to accept them are actually not really 
doing so, but just combining a holistic approach with an anthropocentric 
speciesist one. In fact any theory of value seems implausible if it entails that 
the suffering of sentient beings is not disvaluable. So these holistic theories 
are hardly credible when they entail that the plight of nonhuman animals 
living in the wild is not something that should count as very negative. In 
addition to this, it can be pointed out that ecosystems and biocenoses as 
such do not feel suffering and wellbeing, as individual sentient beings do. 
They do not appear to have experiences. This has important consequences 
if we think having experiences is what matters in order to be negatively or 
positively affected by our actions in a way that is relevant for that which is 
intrinsically valuable or disvaluable. It means that we have to conclude that 
ecosystems or biocenoses do not belong to the group of those that suffer 
disvaluable things, while sentient animals do.
Other theorists have tried to combine the consideration of environmen-
tal wholes with a concern for individual sentient beings (Jamieson 1998; 
Everett 2001; Raterman 2008). This combination, however, is implausible if 
it claims that the disvalue suffered by nonhuman animals cannot outweigh 
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the value of natural nonsentient entities, as these theorists assume. For, 
even if the latter had a significant value, the aggregated disvalue of trillions 
of animals suffering to death has to be enough to outweigh it at some point. 
All this entails that if we want to reject a speciesist viewpoint and to 
consider the interests of individual sentient beings, we have to reject holism 
and to accept the conclusions reached in previous sections.
8. concluSion: thE quEStion of intErvEntion
We have seen that the problem of evil in nature is much more relevant than 
it might seem at first sight. The amount of suffering present in the natural 
world is enormous. The arguments regarding the moral consideration of 
animals entail that this suffering must be considered morally relevant. This 
gives us reason to conclude that we should intervene in those cases where 
it is feasible in order to reduce the disvalue suffered by nonhuman animals. 
That is, in those cases in which we can reduce it as a whole, not in some 
isolated way that reduces disvalue for some in ways that trigger processes 
that result in more suffering elsewhere (Sapontzis 1984; Bonnardel 1996; 
Cowen 2003; Fink 2005; Nussbaum 2006; Horta 2010 and 2013; McMahan 
2010a and 2010b; Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011; Sözmen 2013). Any 
plausible ethical theory must assume that the way we should act must aim 
somehow to achieve a better world, either indirectly or to a certain degree 
(as in deontological theories) or directly and completely (as in teleologi-
cal theories). This being so, the amount of disvalue in the wild is hugely 
relevant and gives us strong reasons to change this situation no matter what 
approach we take to ethics.
As I have stressed before, most people assume nature is a good place 
for nonhuman animals. Due to this, the conclusion that we should inter-
vene in nature for the sake of wild animals may seem counter-intuitive. 
In addition, we can think of other reasons to reject it, such as our lack of 
information about the ways our intervention may affect natural processes, 
the harm that altering these processes can cause for animals and the idea 
that nature is sacred and thus we have a duty not to intervene in it.
We have already seen throughout this paper that some of these reasons 
are not valid. It is false that animals are benefited by the way ecosystems 
work; in fact, it is the other way around: they are harmed by it. Neither are 
there sound reasons to think nature is sacred, at least if we accept that sen-
tient beings are morally considerable, rather than ecosystems or biocenoses. 
It might be argued against this that, even accepting that only sentient 
beings are morally considerable, without proper information interventions 
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may be counter-productive because they can indirectly increase, rather 
than reduce, the harms suffered by animals in the wild. This does not mean 
that we should abandon the idea of acting for the sake of animals in the 
wild. On the contrary, it means we need to research in more detail ways we 
might intervene successfully. 
In addition, in order to succeed in an enterprise such as this there is 
something more important than being well informed about how to act: it is 
necessary to view it as something that should be done. However, as I have 
pointed out before, the intuitions most people have do not favor interven-
ing significantly in nature to help animals. This means that there are some 
important things that we must do today so that in the future there will be 
a will to help animals in nature. They include the following: (i) promot-
ing the arguments for the necessity to reject speciesism, (ii) raising aware-
ness about the huge disvalue that is present in nature for animals, and (iii) 
spreading the idea that intervention in nature to help nonhuman animals is 
not only fully justified, but necessary if we want a better world. 
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